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particularly within the enterprise. The benefits to employers of flexible working time take many 
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Introduction
We are living through a period of fundamental change in the way work is conducted 
and governed around the world. Employment relations institutions are being chal-
lenged and restructured under the weight of global economic pressure. The demand 
for more flexibility by organizations and individuals in how work is conducted has 
grown in light of new economic challenges. Companies want flexible structures and 
work processes that allow them to adjust their labor resources to meet rapidly chang-
ing market demands. This push for flexibility by companies is also contributing to the 
growth of decentralized bargaining structures that allow for more open standards that 
reflect local needs. At the same time, workers desire more flexibility in when, how, 
and where they work. The increase in female labor force participation, the rise of dual 
earner couples, and the costs of child rearing have altered the balance between work 
and non-work roles and contributed to a variety of flexible work arrangements across 
countries (Berg et al. 2004).  
Germany is no exception to this trend. Much has been written about the 
changing German employment relations model, the decentralization of bargaining, 
and the decline of union and employer association membership. The current literature 
on the transformation of German employment relations (Thelen/Kume 1999; 
Thelen/Van Wijnbergen 2003; Behrens 2004; Bosch 2004; Raess 2006; Doellgast/ 
Greer 2007), and Herrigel in this volume, show that while the German system is not 
breaking apart it is changing.  Competitive conditions are leading to much 
experimentation within the system. Traditional roles are being challenged and new 
roles are emerging. These changes have resulted in a more diverse and decentralized 
German employment relations model with varying consequences for employers and 
employees. 
Working time issues have not been brought into the center of this debate about 
the transformation of German employment relations. In this paper, I show how 
flexible working time is an integral part of the German employment relations system 
and how flexible working time arrangements are contributing to its transformation. In 
addition, I discuss the implications that flexible working time has for employers and 
employees and the lessons the German experience with flexible working time has for 
the United States. 
Varying daily and weekly hours, averaging weekly working time, and working time 
accounts are widespread throughout the German economy and have emerged in 
Germany as crucial mechanisms to increase the flexibility and productivity of labor. 
The practices associated with working time flexibility are prime examples of how the 
German social partners are spawning new ways to increase competitiveness and 
provide employees with flexibility. Flexibile working time practices are also key 
elements of opening clauses that shift bargaining power from sectoral collective 
agreements to local management and works councils. Thus, working time flexibility 
plays a significant role in reinforcing both decentralization within the German 
collective bargaining system and in the tension that exists between labor union 
interests in maintaining sector labor standards and local actors interests in working 
conditions tailored to their needs. This tension is evident in the negotiation of pacts 
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for employment and competitiveness (PECs), which restructure working time 
arrangements to gain cost savings in exchange for employment security guarantees.  
The use and importance of flexible working time within Germany has significant 
and differing implications for employers, employees, and the future direction of the 
German model. Employers clearly benefit from flexible working time by more 
efficiently using labor resources. The impact of flexible working time arrangements on 
employees, however, is more mixed and depends very much on how these 
arrangements are structured and the control employees have over the use of time 
(Berg et al. 2004). Details such as the time period over which weekly working hours 
are averaged, the consistency of their schedule, the options employees have in 
balancing their working time accounts, the extent to which employees can draw on 
their banked hours, and the extent to which employees have access to overtime 
premiums are important in determining employee experiences with working time. The 
terms and conditions of working time flexiblity have been shaped by collective 
negotiations and vary widely across sectors and companies. The decline of 
unionization and works councils coverage raises the issue of whether these 
instititutions can effectively represent worker interests in working time flexibility 
across the whole economy. The form and distribution of working time flexibility is 
continually being negotiated and changed. It is both driving and responding to 
changes in the German employment relations system.
In the next section, I briefly discuss the institutional arrangements of the German 
employment relations model and how they are changing. I then focus on the extent of 
working time flexibility in the German employment relations system. Next, I examine 
the implications of these time flexibility practices for employers, employees, and the 
German employment relations system. I conclude with a discussion of what the U.S. 
can learn from flexible working time practices in Germany. 
The German employment relations model 
The literature on the German employment relations model has emphasized many 
different aspects of the institutional infrastructure that governs the employment ex-
perience. Finegold and Soskice (1988) view Germany as generating a “high skills equi-
librium” that can justify good wages at the middle and low ends of the wage distribu-
tion. Streeck (1991) describes a “diversified quality production” model that focuses on 
how the polyvalent skills of the workforce and the organization of work in German 
firms generate high productivity and functional flexibility.  Coates (2000) describes 
Germany as practicing “negotiated capitalism,” and Hall and Soskice (2001) character-
ize Germany as a “coordinated market economy” where industrial relations practices 
work with corporate governance decisions and educational institutions to create incen-
tives for long-term decision making and innovation. All these models emphasize 
Germany’s strength in high skill, functionally flexible, high value-added production 
supported by an employment relations system that supports centralized bargaining 
structures and participation in decision-making at the firm level. 
Events over the last 15 years have generated much discussion over whether these 
characterizations of German employment relations still make sense and whether the 
German employment relations system can survive in a globalized economy (Bosch et 
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al. 2006). The unification of Germany brought with it tremendous cost to the country 
and fundamental changes to the employment relations system. The centralized bar-
gaining structures of western Germany have been eroded by the lack of adoption of 
sectoral collective agreements by firms in eastern Germany and declining union and 
employer association membership. In addition, works councils remain clustered in 
large firms with smaller firms largely unaffected by this form of interest representa-
tion. In 2004, in West Germany only 10 percent of firms had a works council, whereas 
47 percent of all employees were represented by a works council at their workplace 
(Ellguth/Kohaut 2005).
For some, these events demonstrate the decline of the German employment 
relations model and its incompatibility with the current global economic envrionment 
(Martin/Ross 1999; Nickell et al. 2005; Eichhorst/Konle-Seidl 2006). For others, 
these events indicate that the German employment relations system is in transition, 
reconfiguring based on its own unique institutions to meet a variety of economic and 
social needs (Iversen et al. 2000; Thelen/Kume 1999; Hall/ Soskice 2001). Many of 
the elements of the German employment relations system remain intact despite 
economic and political pressure, but as new employment relations practices and 
behaviors emerge, outcomes at the workplace are becoming more diverse.  
Behrens and Jacoby (2004) describe this time as a period of experimentalism 
within German collective bargaining. Their analysis of the chemical, metal, and 
construction sectors does not show a rejection of the foundation of the employment 
relations system or an effort by employers to unilaterally pursue a neo-liberal agenda. 
Rather, they see greater decentralization occuring within the system, moving control 
from centralized organizations (national unions and employer associations) to local 
organizations (union locals, works councils, and individual employers) (Behrens/ 
Jacoby 2004: 118). This decentralization reflects the desire of local actors for more 
flexibility.
Doellgast and Greer (2007: 70f.) describe the changing employment relations 
system as undergoing vertical disintegration. Their case studies in the auto and 
telecommunications industries show that decentralization in the employment relations 
system has occurred not just through opening clauses but also by firms outsourcing 
work covered under sectoral collective agreements to establishments with a weaker 
firm-level agreement or no agreement at all. This is contributing to the development 
of core and periphery workers within Germany along the industry production chain. 
In addition, outsourcing has fostered a complex mix of firm, sectoral, and 
occupational bargaining strcutures within each industry, making it difficult for worker 
representatives to coordinate working conditions across groups.  
The changes occuring in the German employment relations system are essentially 
an ongoing restructuring of the roles of centralized and decentralized actors in the 
system. Power is being shifted away from sectoral unions and employer associations 
and toward local management, and where present, works councils. Flexible working 
time reinforces this trend and contributes to the tension between centralized and 
decentralized actors. Unions and employer associations set the parameters of working 
time in sectoral agreements, but also allow for much detail to be determined by local 
actors. This procedure means that working time is contested ground on several levels. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 15. Jg., Heft 2, 2008   137 
Flexible working time is a condition of work that is negotiated and renegotiated by 
unions and employer associations within sectoral agreements and by local 
management and works councils within plant agreements, by individual employees 
and their supervisors. As power shifts to local actors, it is unlikely that labor unions 
can fully protect flexible working time standards negotiated in sectoral agreements 
because of given the variety of work schedules within enterprises, the low presence of 
works councils across establishments and the use of PECs by management to gain 
working time flexibility concessions.  
Working time flexibility in the German employment relations model 
Time flexibility in scheduling, work arrangements, and leaves are an integral part of 
the decentralization taking place in the German employment relations system. Sectoral 
collective agreements seek to balance interests in establishing standard practices across 
the sector and in allowing establishments flexibility in meeting individual needs. 
Working time flexibility is a key mechanism used by invidual companies and 
establishments to gain flexiblity in meeting changing demands and improving 
efficiency. Flexible working time is a major component of opening clauses, a crucial 
element of PECs, and an important means of shifting power to local management and 
works councils. Moreover, it is a critical working condition that exemplifies the overall 
tension in employment relations system between sectoral standardization and local 
flexibility.
The 1984 collective agreement on working time reduction in the metal industry 
was a key moment in the development of working time flexibility within Germany. In 
1984, IG Metall waged a national strike over a general reduction in weekly working 
time to 35 hours with full pay. After mediation, a compromise was reached in which 
weekly working time was reduced 1.5 hours in exchange for flexibility in implementing 
the reduction at the plant level. According to the sectoral agreement, works councils 
and managers were to negotiate how to structure the working time reduction. The 
sectoral agreement allowed for variation in working time in response to product de-
mand, and for working time to vary across types of workers, e.g. skilled workers could 
work longer hours to avoid production delays. Subsequent collective agreements in 
1987 and 1990 led to further reductions in working time and continued to effectively 
increase the role of works councils in structuring working time arrangements. These 
agreements reflected the shift from blanket reduction in working time to flexibility in 
the structure of working time at the establishment level (Thelen 1993: 30). These 
agreements in the metalworking industry essentially provided a model for German 
companies to achieve flexibility and gain efficiency in the face of greater competition 
during the 1990s. This led to the emergence over time of a variety of working time 
flexibility models in sectoral and company agreements across the economy.  
Working time flexibility is a multi-dimensional construct. It consists of the 
duration and timing of work. Duration refers to the length of working time, and 
timing refers to when one works. Duration and timing essentially define the work 
schedule or how many hours over what period of days one works. Typically, the 
practices associated with working time flexibility include: schedules, leaves, working 
time accounts, annualized hours contracts, weekly averaging of working time, and 
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flexible work arrangements such as less than full-time work and short-hours jobs 
(Berg et al. 2004). Working time flexibility also encompasses the opportunity workers 
have for work schedule variability as well as the choice and control employers and 
employees maintain over the work schedule. Thus, working time flexibility inherently 
concerns not only the duration and timing of work but also issues of opportunity, 
choice and control excercised by employers and employees. To say that there is 
flexibility in working time is not to imply that workers have total control over their 
work hours or that both employers and employees benefit equally from flexible 
working time practices. 
There is not just one form of working time flexibility in Germany but many types, 
the effects of which differ for employers and employees. The flexible work schedules, 
flexi-time, and short and long term accounts can give employees flexibility in meeting 
work and family demands and give employers improved efficiency. Whether these 
mutual gains are realized depends on the details of the working time arrangements and 
the actions of managers and worker representatives as well as individual workers and 
their supervisors. However, often as part of PECs, working time flexibility can also 
lead to unpaid overtime, a reduction in work hours and subsequent loss in employee 
income, as well as the substitution of part-time work for full-time work. In these 
cases, working time flexibility becomes part of a concession bargaining strategy trad-
ing flexibility for employment security. These different aspects to working time flexi-
bility are important parts of sectoral collective agreements, which have been crucial in 
driving flexible working time throughout the economy. Working time provisions and 
arrangements vary within these agreements across sectors. Understanding the details 
of working time arrangements and the institutions that govern them are critical to 
understanding their implications. Thus, in the next section, I discuss how working 
time flexibility is treated in three sectors. 
Working time flexibility in sectoral collective agreements 
The discussion of working time flexibility in sectoral collective agreements in this 
section is based on information gathered in Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv (1996; 
2005). These two documents are an excellent source of detailed information on work-
ing time provisions in major sectoral agreements. These agreements articulate three 
areas of potential flexibility in working time: (1) the designation of standard weekly 
working days, (2) the daily and/or weekly upper and lower limits within which work-
ing time may fluctuate, (3) the equalization period within which weekly working time 
must reach its average level (2005: 9). The flexibility potential detailed in working time 
provisions in collective agreements has increased in the last several years. The ability 
of establishments to structure and divide working time across employees has ex-
panded. It is common across a wide variety of sectors for weekly working time to vary 
substantially week to week. The agreements typically have opening clauses allowing 
works councils to reduce or extend working time for certain groups of workers or for 
firms that undergo economic distress. Works councils play a critical role at the estab-
lishment level in structuring working time and creating working time accounts in 
which employees can bank hours for future paid time off or cash. Working time ac-
counts are available to a significant number of workers and their use continues to 
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grow. In 2003, 42 percent of workers in the west and 38 percent of workers in the east 
worked a schedule with access to a working time account (Bauer et al. 2004). The 
average hours worked should reach the established standard average weekly working 
hours over some equalization period, usually set at six or twelve months; however, 
hours worked in excess of this standard average can be banked in a working time ac-
count (2005). Some agreements have established long-term working time accounts 
that allow employees to carry balances over extended periods of time. The ability to 
vary hours over long periods of time and tailor working time to particular groups of 
workers provide firms the capacity to increase efficiency by better matching labor 
supply to fluctuations in product or service demand. 
Not only have collective agreements established the ability to vary weekly work-
ing time, but also the possibility of long-term changes to standard weekly working 
time in cases where companies can show jobs are threatened by competition. These 
types of opening clauses allow management and works councils to negotiate either 
increases or reductions in standard weekly working hours in exchange for some type 
of employment security. These PECs are key mechanisms for employers to lower cost 
and gain concessions through adjustments in working time. In addition, they reduce 
worker access to overtime premium pay and therefore lower overall employee com-
pensation (Rehder 2003). Whereas the vast majority of PECs provide guarantees 
against involuntary layoffs (71%), 13 percent of PECs provide no management guar-
antees at all. Even in cases with formal guarantees against involuntary layoffs, man-
agement can still reduce employment by offering retirement incentives and employee 
attrition (Seifert/Heiko 2005: 226).  
Flexible working time in three sectors 
To provide more detail on flexible working time provisions, I focus on collective 
agreements in the chemical, banking, and metalworking sectors and discuss how 
working time provisions have evolved over time and how unions and employer 
associations are managing the tension around decentralization.  
Chemicals
The 1995 sectoral agreement in the chemical industry in West Germany established a 
standard workweek of 37.5 hours with a weekly working time corridor of 35 – 40 
hours within which working time can vary. Working hours for particular groups of 
workers can be set within this range with the agreement of the works council. Any 
effort within this corridor to establish working time off the standard for a large part of 
the enterprise must be done with the agreement of the collective bargaining parties, 
e.g. the employer association and trade union. This is one way the sectoral collective 
bargaining parties retain some control over the decentralization of working time stan-
dards. Flexi-time or banking hours worked above the standard weekly average of 37.5 
hours is possible through an enterprise agreement with the works council. One is able 
to maintain a balance of up to 16 hours. The equalization period by which the average 
standard weekly working time must be reached and working time balances cleared is 
12 months. The agreement specifies a 36 month equalization period for those engaged 
in project work. No language regarding working time accounts was in the 1995 agree-
ment.
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The 1995 sectoral agreement in the chemical industry in East Germany was more 
traditional than the agreement in West Germany. It set a standard average work week 
of 40 hours with no specific working time corridor. Flexi-time or banking hours 
worked above the standard weekly average of 40 hours is possible through an enter-
prise agreement with the works council. One is able to maintain a balance of up to 
only 10 hours. The equalization period by which the average standard weekly working 
time must be reached and working time balances cleared is 6 months. The agreement 
also contains no language regarding working time accounts (1996). These collective 
agreements demonstrate how working time is an important part of the decentraliza-
tion taking place within German collective bargaining. The sectoral agreements estab-
lish particular areas where enterprise agreements with works councils would allow 
deviations from standard working time for particular groups on a more permanent 
basis and empower works councils to negotiate the structure of flexi-time work 
schedules that permit workers to bank hours as paid time off. 
Since 2004 sectoral agreements in the east and west chemical industries have in-
cluded provisions that permit enterprise agreements with works councils to establish 
and structure working time accounts. The collective agreements provide the overall 
parameters of short-term and long-term time accounts, whereas the works councils 
through enterprise agreements fill in the details about how many hours can be banked, 
procedures for banking hours, and the use of those hours. In addition, the agreement 
establishes some insurance protection for the positive working time account balances. 
The 2004 agreements also reflect concern by the collective bargaining parties 
about too much decentralization to the works council, and therefore, have provisions 
that require their approval. Whereas the standard average work week in the east re-
mains at 40 hours, companies may adopt the 37.5 hours standard with an enterprise 
agreement with the works council and consent by the collective bargaining parties. 
This consent is also required in establishing an equalization period of 36 months for 
employees on project work. This provision is now found in both east and west con-
tracts. In addition, both east and west contracts include provisions on part-time work 
and working part-time in preparation for retirement (2005). How effective these con-
sent provisions will be in checking the power of local management and works councils 
is unclear. 
Banking
In the banking sector agreement, the standard average work week is 39 hours with a 
maximum weekly working time set at 45 hours. Working hours may vary if agreed to 
with the works council through an enterprise agreement. The development of working 
time provisions from 1995 to 2004 in the west and east banking industries include an 
expansion of the equalization period from 3 to 6 months, the introduction of long-
term working time accounts, and expansion of Saturday work. The structure of the 
long-term working time accounts is determined by enterprise agreement with the 
works council; however, the sectoral agreement limits the maximum accumulation to 
175 hours per calendar year. The 2004 agreement expands the conditions under which 
employees can be asked to work Saturdays to include not only particular locations and 
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functions but also places where competitive pressure is high and other credit granting 
institutions are working on Saturdays (2005).   
In addition to standard opening clauses empowering works councils to negotiate 
the structure and conditions for varying working time, the 2004 banking sector 
agreement also contains a provision allowing enterprise agreements with the works 
council to reduce working hours up to 31 hours a week with a compensatory 20 per-
cent reduction in pay to secure jobs and avoid layoffs. This provision is an example of 
a PEC as part of a collective agreement rather than a plant agreement.  In their analy-
sis of PECs, Seifert and Heiko (2005) indicate that 24 percent of PECs were based on 
labor agreements negotiated by trade unions and employer associations or local man-
agement. The majority of PECs focuses on investment, productivity enhancement, 
and work sharing as opposed to direct compensation reduction. The most often used 
practices to achieve flexibility in PECs are working time measures, including time off 
in lieu of overtime pay, working time accounts, reductions in the use of overtime, and 
working time reductions (with or without pay). In contrast to the Chemical sector 
agreement where unions and the employer association are trying to regain some con-
trol over working time through consent provisions, the PEC in the banking sector is 
an example of using flexible working time as a concession to gain employment secu-
rity. This approach encourages decentralization of working time standards across the 
sector and shifts power to local actors.  
Metalworking
The metalworking industry collective sectoral agreement is well known for its flexible 
working time practices. Standard average weekly working hours are 35 hours in the 
west and 38 in the east. The agreements also specify that it is possible to increase wor-
king time up to 40 hours a week for 18 percent of the workforce (13 percent in the 
east); however, under certain conditions longer working hours can be extended to up 
to 50 percent of the workforce (45 percent in the east) if the collective bargaining 
parties agree. This more recent provision reflects the trend away from working time 
reduction and toward increasing working hours.  
The 2004 “Pforzheim Agreement” in the metalworking industry takes a slightly 
different approach to decentralization than the other two sectors by allowing compa-
nies to deviate from any regulation in the sectoral agreement as long as it increases or 
stabilizes existing employment, brings new investments, or enhances competitiveness. 
In response to employers’ demands for more local flexibility, IG Metall requires that 
companies demonstrate economic hardship by opening up their financial records and 
asking external auditors to prepare expert assessments prior to any plant agreement 
(Jürgens et al. 2006). In addition, management must create a mid-term strategy docu-
ment explaining how the changes will meet target goals and offer a return to employ-
ees, e.g. job guarantees (Leutz 2007). 
This agreement differs from the typical PEC in that it demands external valida-
tion of the economic situation of the firm. Access to balance sheets and an external 
auditor’s assessment are designed to restrict the use of this option only to firms that 
are truly experiencing economic difficulty. However, as firms initiate this procedure, 
IG Metall is now engaging in more plant and company level bargaining (Jürgens et al. 
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2006: 15). Thus, as power shifts to the establishments, IG Metall must try to defend 
standards on a plant by plant, company by company basis. This will have implications 
for the use of IG Metall resources into the future. 
Comparisons across the three sectoral agreements make clear the important role 
of works councils in negotiating the details of flexible working time arrangements. It is 
also clear that there is not one approach to flexible working time. Different sectors 
have different models and each is coping with further pressure toward decentraliza-
tion. This comparison also reveals that flexible working time is operating on multiple 
levels. In one sense, framework provisions that specify parameters for work hours, 
equalization periods, and working time account usage provide workers with a mini-
mum standard regarding working time and rights to banking paid time worked. But 
when economic times are difficult for firms and employers pursue a PEC, flexible 
working time arrangements can change and become a means of concessionary bar-
gaining leading to shorter or longer hours without comparable pay. While employment 
security is no doubt welcomed by the employees, achieving that security risks under-
mining the flexible working time standards established across sectoral agreements. 
This exacerbates tension between works councils and unions and has raised questions 
about the legitimacy of works council action (Rehder 2006).  
Implications of working time flexibility for employers, workers, and the 
German model of employment relations 
Flexible working time practices bring significant benefits for German employers. Be-
ing able to vary daily and weekly working hours without adjusting pay allows employ-
ers to more effectively synchronize labor demand and labor supply without bearing 
the cost of overtime premiums. Working time arrangements with hours averaging and 
working time accounts to bank future paid time off have advantages for a variety of 
businesses, including those that focus on project work where hours vary over the life 
of the project as well as those subject to seasonal or business cycle variation. 
An electro-optic systems company I visited in 2000 provides an example of how 
employers can benefit from time flexibility on project work.1 Members of a work 
group at this company are assigned a project to build a new piece of equipment over a 
six to nine month period. The project is structured to require an average of 38 hours 
of work per week. Within the working time corridor, an agreement is reached between 
managers and the work group about how many hours they can work each week over 
the six or nine months of the project. Managers and workers can agree on working 
shorter weekly hours during the design phase, and then increase hours as the piece of 
equipment goes into production. Under this working time model, the employee is paid 
for 38 hours per week regardless of what they actually work. The company agreement 
specified an equalization period of two years for hours worked over the 38 hour 
weekly average. Only balances over 44 weekly hours are paid at a premium rate. At the 
end of two years, employees are able to take their balances as cash or paid time off. 
From the perspective of the company, the main advantage of this working time 
model was the cost savings on overtime and the decoupling of pay from time worked. 
                                                          
1  The working time model described here is still in use today. 
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With a constant rate of pay and an equalization period of two years, worker behavior 
is shifting to a salary model where one works to the needs of the project without a 
regular accounting of time premiums. The overtime premium is only paid at the end 
of the equalization period if the worker has worked in excess of an average of 44 
hours a week over 2 years. The advantage to the company is (a) that it reduces the 
total volume of working hours because they have the flexibility to go down to 32 
hours a week during slack times and (b) they will usually not have to pay premium pay 
for hours worked above 38 a week. In addition, they are adjusting work hours and 
developing different schedules tailored to particular occupations. 
Other general advantages to firms of varying daily and weekly working time is that 
it saves the cost of laying off workers because of business cycle variation and the cost of 
training new hires. Firms are able to keep continuity within work teams, retain critical 
skills, and amortize human capital investments over a longer period of time. These are 
important considerations in an economy based on highly skilled workers. Further train-
ing of employees is also facilitated by banking excess hours worked. Many contracts and 
plant agreements allow management to use these hours for further training. Thus, train-
ing that was previously on straight time as part of the normal work day is being covered 
now by hours earned in excess of normal working time (Seifert 2007).   
These flexible working time practices also open up other forms of flexibility for 
German firms. Under codetermination legislation, works councils and management 
must agree on overtime hours. Working time accounts and averaging the work week 
within some corridor of hours means fewer overtime hours. Employers are able to 
obtain the extra work as part of the structures set up in the enterprise agreement and 
do not need to engage in separate discussions with the works council about overtime. 
Furthermore, working time accounts and varying hours worked essentially decouple 
pay from hours worked as discussed in the example from the electro-optic firm. An 
employee is paid a salary for the standard weekly working hours, e.g. 38 hours. One is 
expected to vary the actual hours worked to the needs of the business. Overtime is 
only calculated on hours worked over the average at the end of an equalization period, 
e.g. one year. These hours are banked in a working time account, which has essentially 
become a new form of compensation. These hours are worked but not paid to the 
employee until some future date. They are a debt owed to employees, which in some 
cases is never paid. Eleven percent of time balances expire from working time ac-
counts that have no equalization period regulations. Only 2 percent expire from work-
ing time accounts that do have such regulations (Bauer et al. 2004). 
While there are many advantages to employers of flexible working time arrange-
ments, there are also costs to be borne. For many firms, employment guarantees may 
be required to achieve such flexibility (although these guarantees do not prevent all 
forms of workforce reduction). In addition, firms must manage the varied work 
schedules of employees. This usually results in more time spent by middle managers 
and supervisors to coordinate schedules within and across work groups.  
For workers, the effect of working time flexibility is more mixed. On the one 
hand, there are clearly advantages over a fixed work schedule where employees are not 
able to make any independent decisions to deviate from set work times. Fixed work 
schedules provide employees with predictability in planning their non-working lives, 
144 Peter Berg: Working Time Flexibility in the German Employment Relations System 
but these schedules do not allow employees to adjust to pressures and changes that are 
part of non-work responsibilities in advanced economies. Flexible working time ar-
rangements found in Germany do not provide workers total control over their working 
time nor do they subject workers to total control by management. While variation in 
working time is primarily driven by the needs of the business, surveys indicate that 89 
percent of employees say that they have influence over their start and end times (Bauer 
et al. 2004). Moreover, 71 percent of employees say that they can change their working 
time at short notice in the event of unforeseen circumstances. Only 17 percent of em-
ployees, however, say they can manage their working time accounts as they wish. This 
percentage varies by occupation with white collar employees at the high end of the dis-
tribution and shift workers at the low end (Seifert 2003: 54). In general, employees indi-
cate that they have some limited control over their working time, but exercising this 
control must be done in negotiation or consultation with others. 
A 1999/2000 survey of works councilors regarding time withdrawals from work-
ing time accounts reinforces this notion. “In the overwhelming majority of companies 
with a works council, the withdrawal of time credits from working time accounts takes 
place in consultation with superiors (67%) or colleagues (30%)” (Seifert 2003: 54). 
This demonstrates that the exercise of working time control is very decentralized, 
often relying on compromise among individuals within groups or between supervi-
sors. The pervasiveness of flexible working time has led to more negotiation at multi-
ple levels within the employment relations system. It remains an open question how 
well equipped individuals are to handle these negotiations, particularly in the absence 
of works councils, or what role unions and works councils play in strengthening indi-
viduals in these types of negotiations.  
Whereas German workers indicate some degree of individual control over working 
time, they also benefit from collective control over working time (Berg et al. 2004). In 
comparison with the United States, union representatives and works councils are ac-
tively present, at least in large firms, structuring the terms and parameters of individual 
working time negotiations. They have negotiated various working time accounts and 
insurance protection for long-term account balances. They also are able to monitor 
working time arrangements to ensure the employers follow procedures and employees 
do not lose their accumulated account balances. The ability to exercise codetermination 
rights is a key factor affecting control over working time.  
Working time flexibility brings with it other advantages to employees. It serves as 
an alternative to forced redundancies and has provided employees with employment 
security in the face of growing international competition. The use of working time 
accounts allows workers to take sabbatical-type leaves, expand further training oppor-
tunities, and reduce hours in anticipation of retirement (Seifert 2006: 29).  
On the other hand, working time flexibility comes at a cost to workers. The aver-
age contractual standard weekly working hours is 38.9 in West Germany and 39.8 in 
East Germany, but actual weekly working hours is 2.5 hours on average higher than 
the contractual standard (Bauer et al. 2004). After years of working time reduction, 
there is concern that hours of work are increasing again, particularly among highly 
skilled workers and firms outside of sectoral collective agreements (Haipeter/ 
Lehndorff 2005). With flexi-time and working time corridors, German flexible work-
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ing time practices allow for the expansion of hours without the overtime pay premi-
ums. This results in a loss of income or the substitution of future time off for imme-
diate increases in pay. Where workers accrue future paid time off, accessing these 
balances depends very much on whether they have access to working time accounts, 
the procedures for saving and accessing balances, and the presence of a works council 
at the enterprise. For example, those workers without access to a working time ac-
count work more unpaid overtime on average per week (1.3 hours) than those with 
access to a working time account (.3 hours). Even for employees that have access to a 
working time account, 22 percent of employees work with no specified equalization 
period or upper hours limit. For these employees, time balances are more likely to be 
paid out in cash or simply expire without being used (Bauer et al. 2004). Moreover, 
flexible working time practices can also reduce work-family balance as they often re-
sult in schedules that include atypical work hours, such as on Saturday and Sunday.
In short, it is unions and works councils that can mitigate the negative effects 
from flexible working time practices by negotiating clear standards around which time 
flexibility is built, by exercising codetermination rights in setting work schedules, and 
by monitoring the actions of management to ensure employees are fairly compensated 
for the hours they work. Where unions and works councils are not present the risk of 
longer hours and unpaid overtime increase.  
With regards to implications for the German employment relations system, work-
ing time flexibility is an important element in the further decentralization of German 
employment relations. As discussed previously, flexible working time is a key element 
of opening clauses and PECs, which bring flexibility into the workplace. The practice 
of working time flexibility, however, is also encouraging further decentralization be-
yond plant agreements at the enterprise. While unions set standards and works coun-
cils set the details of flexible work arrangements, actual working hours are often the 
result of individual negotiations, especially in professional jobs or in small and me-
dium size firms where works councils are not present. Working time is becoming less 
of a standardized working condition and more of an individual or group variable es-
tablished at the sub-enterprise level. Moreover, given individual and group negotia-
tions over time, works councils have less ability to regulate overtime hours, which 
weakens an important right of the works council. 
Whereas unions continue their defense of sectoral collective agreements that bal-
ance centralized bargaining structures with enterprise flexibility, working time flexibility 
practices pose new challenges to works councils in monitoring the myriad of work 
schedules across occupations and work processes as well as the separate negotiations 
taking place within work groups and with supervisors. This also works against union 
attempts to establish working time standards within sectors. Flexible working time prac-
tices require not only new ways of managing people but also new actions by works 
councils to balance collective needs with individual desires. Thus, flexible working time 
is not only decentralizing bargaining power but individualizing working conditions and 
challenging employee representatives to support worker interests without negotiating 
away access and control over working time arrangements beneficial to the employee. 
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Lessons for the United States 
Institutions that govern the employment relationship in the United States are quite dif-
ferent than those in Germany. Union density and coverage is much lower in the U.S., 
and employers have much more discretion in dealing with personnel matters. U.S. 
workers possess no codetermination rights and can only win representation by labor 
unions through elections by a simple majority. Even when unions win elections, about a 
third of the victories do not result in a first contract as employers utilize appeal proc-
esses and other mechanisms to prevent contracts. Although U.S. workers cannot be 
dismissed for reasons of gender, age, or race, they generally work in an employment at-
will environment and can only win just cause protection through union representation. 
In comparison with Germany, U.S. employers enjoy far fewer restrictions on dismissal. 
The employment relationship in the U.S. is viewed as primarily an economic trans-
action between relatively equal parties, reflecting the country’s liberal market economy 
(Block et al. 2004). Employers are offering jobs at particular wages and working condi-
tions and employees can accept these terms or look elsewhere in the labor market. Be-
cause the social component of the employment relationship and the inherent imbalance 
of power between employers and employees are not recognized, there is minimal per-
ceived need for government intervention. U.S. workers have no legal right to annual 
leave, sick leave, personal or carer’s leave, bereavement leave, or time off for public 
holidays. Health insurance coverage is obtained as an employee benefit, dependent upon 
employment rather than a right of every individual in the society. Maintaining one’s 
health care coverage has a huge impact on labor supply decisions. People will work 
more hours and atypical times in order to maintain their jobs and health coverage. 
With regard to legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has an important 
impact on working time flexibility in the United States. This law applies to non-
supervisory workers, e.g. those without administrative, professional, or executive du-
ties, and those who are paid on an hourly basis and earn less than $ 455 per week. For 
these workers any hours worked over 40 hours in a week are paid at 1.5 premium rate. 
The intent of the FLSA is to raise the cost to employers of scheduling long hours. It 
was passed in 1935 as a worker safety issue and a way to check employer abuse. How-
ever, many employers today maintain that it limits their ability to implement flexible 
schedules, which would be advantageous for the business as well as desired by em-
ployees. Employers have sought to avoid the requirements of the FLSA by reclassify-
ing employees as “exempt” from the act, i.e. not subject to overtime premium pay, 
who were previously consider “non-exempt.” In 2004, the Bush administration issued 
new regulations for the FLSA that increased the ability of employers to reclassify wor-
kers in this way (Eisenbrey 2004). 
In 2003, there was a proposal to give workers the opportunity to exchange com-
pensatory time off in lieu of overtime payments for extra hours worked. The Republi-
can-sponsored Family Time Flexibility Act sought to change the Fair Labor Standards 
Act to allow private sector employers the ability to offer their employees the choice of 
opting for paid time off as compensation for working overtime hours. The choice of 
taking paid time off in lieu of overtime cash wages would be paid at a rate of 1.5 hours 
of compensatory time per hour of overtime worked. Overtime pay would continue to 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 15. Jg., Heft 2, 2008   147 
be calculated at a rate of 1.5 for every hour worked. Employees could accrue up to 
160 hours of compensatory time per year. Any unused compensatory time would be 
paid back to employees in cash at the end of the year (United States House Education 
and Workforce Committee 2003). 
This failed proposal was opposed by labor unions because they did not think that 
the choice of time vs. cash would be fairly given to employees, and because U.S. 
workers lack sufficient representation at the workplace to ensure that they would be 
able to access accrued time balances. Although the proposal states that employees can 
choose whether they want to take time off or cash payments for overtime hours wor-
ked, employers would certainly encourage employees to take the compensatory time 
option so they could avoid costly overtime payments. Moreover, employers, not the 
employees, would decide when the compensatory time could be used. There was 
nothing in the proposal about working time accounts or how accrued working time 
would be accounted for or monitored. The Family Time Flexibility Act was really 
about giving employers more discretion to lower employment costs rather than im-
plementing a sustainable flexible working time system that balances employee and 
employer needs. 
The employment at-will environment encourages employers to use layoffs to reduce 
labor costs rather than invest in working time flexibility as an efficiency tool. Moreover, 
U.S. employers generally view working time flexibility practices as benefits to recruit and 
retain employees not efficiency practices. As such, they are limited in their use. Only 28% 
of all full-time wage and salary workers had flexible schedules that allowed them to vary 
the time they began or ended work, and fewer companies offered flexible scheduling in 
2004 than they did in 2001 (United States Department of Labor 2005).
With pressure to simply maintain wage and benefit levels, the interest of U.S. un-
ions in flexible working time has been rather narrow.  Unions’ primary interests are in 
preserving full-time work with health care and other benefits and therefore tend to 
resist negotiating reductions in weekly working time or part-time work options. With 
full health and pension benefits linked to full-time employment, unions’ priorities lie 
in preserving benefits and the income from full-time work. While unions do negotiate 
alternative work schedules, such as flex-time, compressed work weeks, telecommut-
ing, or job sharing, more effort is put into securing paid leaves for union members and 
preserving overtime premium rates.2 Opportunities to average hours across several 
weeks or bank hours in working time accounts are effectively closed off by the FLSA 
regulations. Given the largely union free and unregulated labor market, working time 
flexibility in the U.S. is for the most part something that is acquired informally 
through individual negotiations with supervisors. Whereas employees in EU countries 
have the right to request flexibility in their work hours, U.S. workers rely on the 
goodwill of management or the bargaining power of unions to gain access to working 
time flexibility. 
                                                          
2  These assessments are based on current research conducted by interviewing different 
local union leaders in different industries across the United States. A good source to view 
examples of contract provisions relating to flexible schedules and leave benefits is the 
Labor Project for Working Families web site: http://www.working-families.org/.
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Legal changes that would raise the cost of dismissals, decouple health care bene-
fits from employment, and provide individuals the right to request alternative work 
schedules would encourage more flexible working time arrangements. Ultimately, 
however, the ability of workers to participate in determining the parameters of flexible 
working time practices, to use these practices, and to maintain these practices as regu-
lar working conditions will depend on reinvigorating unions or some other form of 
interest representation.  
 What the German experience with working time flexibility shows the United Sta-
tes is that there are significant efficiencies to be gained by working time flexibility and 
that these efficiencies can be achieved through collective bargaining and codeter-
mination. Although these institutions of worker representation and participation are 
weakening and power is shifting to local actors, unions and works councils have been 
and remain critical to ensuring that some balance of employee and employer interests 
is maintained in the pursuit of flexibility. Rather than a constraint on working time 
flexibility, these representative institutions have facilitated its use and used it as a key 
element in bargaining to preserve jobs.  
If working time flexibility in the U.S. is to move beyond employee benefit status 
and become a more established condition of work, institutional change will need to 
occur to ensure that workers as well as companies benefit more directly from them. 
Germany shows how time can be used in a decentralized way to meet the efficiency 
needs of individual employers through working time corridors and can be used as a 
form of flexibility for employees. Maintaining such a system of flexibility that balances 
the interests of employers and employees depends ultimately on the institutions that 
govern the workplace.  
Conclusion 
Flexible working time has become an integral part of the employment experience for 
German workers and is a key source of efficiency for German employers. Flexible 
working time is contributing to a transforming, more decentralized German employ-
ment relations system. Varying daily and weekly working time, averaging the weekly 
working hours, and the establishment of working time accounts are efficiency solu-
tions consistent with a highly skilled workforce, employment security, and managed 
decentralization of employment relations. Sectoral collective agreements have been 
effective in establishing working time standards and opening clauses have allowed 
local actors to tailor working time practices to local needs. However, flexible working 
time is also challenging unions and works councils and pushing managed decentraliza-
tion in new ways. PECs use concessions on flexible working time standards to save 
jobs and reduce labor costs. While PECs bring benefits to local workers in terms of 
employment security, they undermine the flexible working time standards negotiated 
at the sectoral level and contribute to tension between works councils and unions. In 
addition, the use of flexible working time practices within firms has also contributed 
to sub-enterprise decentralization of working time flexibility as the involvement of 
individuals and groups in negotiating working time leads to a variety of different 
schedules and practices within the firm. This type of decentralization challenges works 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 15. Jg., Heft 2, 2008   149 
councils and labor unions on how to effectively manage and represent individual wor-
king time needs.  
Flexible working time practices also have differential effects on employers and 
employees. Employers benefit from working time flexibility as an efficiency tool that 
can improve their use of labor and capital and lower overtime premium costs. 
Whether employees benefit from flexible working time practices depends a great deal 
on the extent to which they are part of sectoral agreements and represented by works 
councils. These institutions provide workers with some individual and collective con-
trol over working time. They are also critical to providing procedural clarity to the use 
of flexible working time arrangements and to monitoring working time account bal-
ances. However, the decline of collective bargaining coverage and works councils 
across sectors poses a danger for Germany. Inequity between represented and non 
represented workers in how they experience flexible working time could grow as a 
result. As discussed above, where works councils are not present, workers tend to 
work longer and experience more unpaid overtime. In addition, as flexible working 
time practices get more diverse within firms and labor unions struggle for members, 
representing workers will require new strategies that perhaps emphasize the important 
role labor representatives play in ensuring consistency of procedure and process with 
regards to working time rather than one standard for all workers.  
An important lesson for the United States from Germany is that institutions still 
matter. Despite decentralization and declining union membership, German workers 
still have the right to establish works councils that can codetermine the structure and 
management of working time  and the power of sectoral collective bargaining agree-
ments that provide standards and models for working time flexibility. The result is 
more options and choices with regard to working time in comparison with U.S. work-
ers, who rely on employers to provide time flexibility as a recruitment and retention 
tool. From this side of the Atlantic, the German model of employment relations still 
has a lot to say about how to implement flexible working time in ways that can benefit 
both employers and employees. 
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